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From less than 5% in 1980, the share of nationals from the region in the total foreign population rose to almost 25% in 2000, to become one of the largest foreign communities with
Italy. The Yugoslav group expanded quickly in spite of changes in the Swiss immigration policy in the early 1990s that gave priority to workers from the European Union and limited severely access to the Swiss labor market by immigrants from all other countries of the world.
Interestingly, the growth in the Yugoslav population in Switzerland was mostly generated by large numbers of workers obtaining long-term permits throughout the 1980s and the subsequent inflow of family members. While political crises and wars certainly played a role in the growing emigration from Yugoslavia, in the case of Switzerland, it worked mostly indirectly by inflating the number of workers receiving permits. Very few people obtain permanent resident status in Switzerland through the asylum system. Hence, at first sight, it seems that, despite the political circumstances, immigration from the former Yugoslavia to Switzerland has been generated by similar factors as immigration from countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal or Turkey and therefore, it can be mostly labeled as economic rather than political immigration.
In this paper we evaluate the stability of the determinants of immigration inflows to Switzerland in the face of changes in immigration policy. The analysis is performed on two distinct periods: First from 1981 to 1995, when worker migration to Switzerland was limited by overall quotas with no differentiated treatment across source-countries; second, from 1995 to 2003, when priority was progressively given to workers from the European Union and immigration from all other countries was severely limited to specific skills. Over each period we investigate the extent to which factors driving immigration varied across source countries and possibly skill levels. We also specifically focus on immigrants from Yugoslavia who became one of the main sources of foreign labor in the 1980s and early 1990s and whose immigration was severely restricted with the new policy.
The paper shows that during the earlier period, immigration from the former Yugoslavia (considered a single country throughout the period) responded to income and cost incentives in a very similar way as Southern European countries which are the major suppliers of unskilled workers. During the second period, however, immigrants from BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro appear to have become less sensitive to the relatively high real income in Switzerland than their counterparts from other Southern European countries. This weaker attraction for financial returns may be linked to heavier weight put by migrants from the former Yugoslavia on non-monetary benefits of migration. Indeed they show a much lower probability to return home than nationals from Southern European countries. Also, the cost advantage provided by cultural networks while still positive and significant is also weaker in recent years for nationals from the former Yugoslavia than for other Southern groups. Interestingly, this combination of effects characterizes skilled immigration from Northern European countries. Thus, the change in migration factors for Yugoslav nationals is consistent with the new emphasis on skilled immigration for non-EU countries. Hence, generally speaking, under similar conditions immigrants from the former Republic of Yugoslavia tend to respond in a similar fashion as workers from other countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short survey of immigration policy in Switzerland since the 1970s. In Section 3, a statistical picture of immigration from the former Yugoslavia is presented and compared with that of other major foreign communities in Switzerland. In Section 4, we present the results of the estimation of an augmented gravity equation for the inflow of migrants by source country to Switzerland and Section 5 concludes.
A brief overview of Swiss immigration policy
The stated goals of Swiss immigration policy have always been, and still are, to control the level of foreign resident population while accommodating the demand for labor by the economy. Since 1970 and until 1990, the government implemented a policy based on quotas for work permits, which applied indifferently to citizens from all source countries.
However, in the early 1990s, after the rejection of participation to the European Economic Area (EEA) by popular vote, pressures started to build for more open relations with the European Union, particularly with respect to labor mobility (see Gross, 2006, for details) . This new environment encouraged the government to amend its immigration policy and to introduce differentiated treatment for immigrants from EU/EFTA countries and from other countries of the world. As a consequence, the former Republic of Yugoslavia and the countries issued from it saw the conditions for their migrants change significantly, in particular through increasingly difficult access to the Swiss labor market.
Since the first immigration legislation in 1932, immigration policy in Switzerland has been implemented through the allocation of joint work and residence permits to foreigners with job contracts. A description of the various permits is given in Table 1 . Until its phasing out in the late 1990s and its total abolition in 2002, the main type of temporary permit is the seasonal permit. It has a maximum duration of 9 months per year and is renewable provided the worker gets another job contract. The holder must return to his/her home country for the remaining months of the year and is not allowed to bring family members to Switzerland.
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Workers with job contracts for at least 12 months receive a renewable one-year permit.
Family reunion is permitted (without waiting period since 1993) and statistically holders of such permits are considered permanent residents. After 10 years of successive renewals, the one-year permit can be converted into an establishment permit valid indefinitely with no constraint on mobility. Similarly, after a maximum of 10 years of uninterrupted seasonal work, the person can apply for a one-year permit provided he/she has a contract for a regular job.
Family members and newborns receive the same type of permit as their parent. Finally, asylum seekers who obtain the right to stay in Switzerland receive in most cases a one-year permit.
Since 1970, new work permits (seasonal and one-year permits) are limited by overall quotas as they are directly linked to the growth in foreign resident population. The level of quota for new one-year permits has evolved between 8,500 (in the early 1980s) and 21,000 (in 1970) and for seasonal permits, between 90,000 (in 1998) and more than 200,000 (in 1970; Piguet and Mahnig, 2000) . Until 1990, there is no country-specific policy for immigrants. March 1961 , with Italy, in August 1964 (CH, 2004a . 3 Membership in the EEA was rejected in 1992 by popular vote but the Government immediately begins bilateral negotiations with the EU on a number of economic issues, among which, free mobility of people (see Gross, 2006 , for details).
on skills in shortage; third, all other countries, from which workers are accepted only under exceptional circumstances.
Initially, Yugoslavia was in the second category and there is no significant change in the access by its citizens to the Swiss labor market. However, in 1991, the government decided to move Yugoslavia to the third category because of its human rights record. As a consequence, it lost access to seasonal permits and immigration to Switzerland became limited to skilled workers. Immediately pressures arose from Swiss businesses against that decision, in particular, from the construction and hospitality sectors, which would be greatly affected by restrictions on hiring unskilled temporary and permanent Yugoslav workers. The government partly backed down by allowing a transition period such that, the period for conversions of seasonal permits into one-year permits was extended until 1995 and the issuance of seasonal permits was extended until 1996 when it would definitely stop (Hirter et.al., 2002) . In essence, the new propositions gave four additional years to seasonal workers from Yugoslavia to cumulate the required years for obtaining longer-term status while allowing employers to seek other seasonal workers in the EU. Nevertheless, the 3-circle policy was shown to violate international agreements signed by Switzerland on human rights, and in 1995, all non EU/EFTA countries were merged under the same provisions, that is no access to seasonal permits and access to one-year permits only after EU-nationals have been given priority. As a result, workers from Yugoslavia since then have access to the Swiss labor market only under exceptional circumstances. Note that these amendments set the stage for a new immigration legislation developed after free mobility with EU/EFTA countries came into effect starting in In the 1950s and 1960s, citizens from France, Germany, Italy, and Spain made up more than ¾ of the foreign population 4 (see Table 2 ). In 1960, the Yugoslav community was Germany and Austria (Curtis, 1992) . Nevertheless, 31,578 people were registered as permanent residents in Switzerland that is, held work/residence permits for more than one year and 3,362
held seasonal permits. the historically largest group, the Italians (columns 2 and 5 of Table 2 ) but, by then the former Yugoslav Republic was divided into five distinct countries whose citizens were registered separately. However, it is interesting to note that immigrants from Serbia-Montenegro represented more than half of the community (i.e., 190,723 people or 56.5%, column 2).
Communities from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FYR Macedonia were very similar in sizes (44,296, 43,649, and 55,912 people respectively, or 13.1%, 12.9% and 16.6%); Slovenia was the smallest with 0.8%. The community as a whole kept growing until 2003 but relatively more slowly than others such as the Portuguese, French and German communities, which by then benefited from preferential treatment in hiring and from the early stage of implementation of free mobility for EU-citizens.
Long historical ties between the two countries through guest workers and changes in the immigration policy have also contributed to the expansion of the Yugoslav population in Switzerland between 1980 and 2000, and this is clearly illustrated by major changes in the structure of inflows of new migrants (see Table 3 ). In the early 1980s, of approximately 10,000 new migrants coming from the region, about 30% were conversions of seasonal permits and 45% came under the family reunion category (columns 2 and 3), both escaping quota restrictions. The remaining 25% was made mostly of new one-year permits allocated under quotas and refugees whose claim had been recognized as valid. A decade later, in the mid1990s, war had struck most regions of the former republic; concurrently, citizens from Yugoslavia had lost easy access to work permits and the new deadline set for the end of converting seasonal permits was approaching. In 1994, the number of conversions was almost three times higher than in 1984 (6,464 vs. 2,308) and it represented more than half of all conversions in that year. Each one opens the door to family reunion and consequently has an impact on the overall inflow of permanent residents. Hence, in 1994, the total inflow was four times larger than in 1984 with almost 60% of people coming for family reunion purpose. That 1998 despite the change in Swiss immigration policy which restricted access by Yugoslav nationals to the quotas of work permits during the last years. The growth in population is mainly due to the combined effect of conversions of seasonal permit into longer-term permits and of family reunion. Even though in 1994, recognized refugees from the region represented more than 50% of the total, the actual number was small and played a minor role in the growth of permanent resident population (column 4').
A survey of the evolution of the foreign population would be incomplete without considering the two main components of the outflow: Acquisitions of Swiss nationality and returns to the home country. Given the political turmoil in the region in the 1990s, it is easy to understand why the returns of Yugoslav citizens represent a relatively small portion of all returns (i.e., on average less than 10%, in column 6'). However, it is interesting to note that despite the improved political situation in much of the region, the outflow of permanent residents kept decreasing in recent years. In 2001, the number of returning nationals was at its lowest level since the mid 1980s (less than 3,500 people in column 6) and it is falling rapidly.
In parallel, the number of acquisitions of Swiss nationality was at its highest ever with almost 12,000 in 2003, which represented 1/3 of all naturalizations, much more than its representation in the foreign population (columns 7 and 7'). This happens despite a cumbersome process and additional difficulties members of the Yugoslav community face in being recognized as worthy future citizens in some regions of Switzerland. 8 Moreover, to apply for citizenship, a person must have been residing in Switzerland for a minimum of 12 years with an establishment permit and considering the rise in the allocation of such permits in the late 1990s (column 5), one can only infer that naturalizations are likely to remain at a relatively high level in the future.
The evidence on the inflow and on the outflow combined, suggests that immigrants from the former Republic of Yugoslavia are more inclined than those from other countries to settle permanently in Switzerland. In fact, in 1995, 81% of foreign-born Yugoslavs had been in 8 In 2000 the Swiss citizenship was refused to all applicants from Eastern Europe in a municipality where it is awarded by popular vote (see Gross, 2006 , for details). Nevertheless, a similar outcome is unlikely to happen Switzerland for less than 10 years and 14% for more than 10 years but less than 20 years. In 2003, only 38% had been in the country for less than 10 years and more than ½, for between 10 and 20 years (OFS, 2004a, Table T1117F ).
The last aspect to be briefly surveyed is the regional distribution of the population from the former Republic of Yugoslavia. In Switzerland, Yugoslav immigrants are much more concentrated geographically than other communities (see Figure 1 ). More than 80% are settled in the German-speaking regions against less than 60% for other foreign communities. In fact, migrants from Latin countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal) for obvious cultural reasons have a much higher probability to settle in the French-speaking regions. With these observations in mind we now turn to the estimation of the determinants of migration flows and the evaluation of the intensity of their impact for ethnic groups and particularly for immigrants from the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
again since the Federal Court has ruled such system unconstitutional and, that this particular municipality now has a designated a committee to rule on naturalizations (Le Temps, 2005) . 9 About 50%, 60% and 30% of Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese respectively are settled in the German-speaking area in 1990 and the distribution has changed little over time (OFS, 2005, Table T1123F ).
What drives immigration?
In this section we identify the factors influencing migration of workers from various To better understand the factors that drive migrants to Switzerland we use an inflow framework similar to the one used in Gross and Schmitt (2003) which can be seen as an augmented gravity model for immigrants 11 which corresponds to a reduced form for a supply and demand model of migrations (see, Borjas, 1989 Foot and Milne, 1984 , Helliwell, 1997 , Karemera et. al., 2000 . (1) D k represents alternative dummy variables that are described below and some statistical characteristics of the variables are given in Table 4 . The dependent variable, Lnetinfl i,t is the log of migration flows from country i to Switzerland during period t which is a 3-year subperiod (i.e., t=1 to 3). 12 In an attempt to capture the inflow of "new workers", for the first sample, the net inflow is measured as total new permanent entries net of family reunions and conversions of seasonal permits (i.e., column 1 net of columns 2 and 3, in Table 3 ). Family reunion provisions in immigration legislation act as an automatic multiplier of migration flows with a lag (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986) The literature on international migrations identifies a number of other factors beyond those four, which influence the migration decision (see Massey et al., 1993 , for a survey).
Among them, the costs of migrating, monetary as well as psychological costs have long been considered important determinants of migrants' decision. Empirical studies using gravity models for overall migration flows strongly support the role of monetary costs (see for example, Helliwell, 1997 and Karemera et. al., 2000) . Consequently, we test for the impact of sharing a border with Switzerland using a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for France, Germany, Italy, and Austria (Com. border). It is worth noting that all countries that border Switzerland also share their language with it, another factor seen as decreasing the cost of migrating. There is also a significant role for non-monetary costs such as cultural and psychological costs, which are at the source of the so-called network effects. The search for ways to diminish these costs materializes in agglomeration of migrants, or cultural clustering which have a positive pull-effect on future inflows (see, for example, Dodson, 2001, and Bartel, 1989) . Cultural clustering may also offer more appealing employment opportunities and, thus, alleviate transition costs on the labor market (see Gross and Schmitt, 2003) .
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Persistence generated by network effect is taken into account by the size of the resident population from the same source country (Lnetwork i,t-1 ) and the effect is expected to be positive.
In their analysis of immigration flows to the United States, Hatton and Williamson (2002) 
Period of general quota: 1981 to 1995
The results of the estimation for various specifications are given in Table 5 and, for easier comparisons, a summary of the main elasticities is also provided in the lower panel of the table. First some tests for robustness of results to some fixed effects are briefly surveyed.
Note that because of a high correlation between Swiss population and Swiss income per capita (see Appendix, Table A .I.), the population variable has been eliminated from the specification. 15 Also, the quota variable itself was not significant while the unemployment rate has a sign consistent with a proxy for quotas as well as with job prospects for immigrants. We therefore use the unemployment rate in all specifications. Comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table   5 , there is no major impact from the introduction of the 3-circle policy on elasticities except for source income which takes the unexpected positive coefficient. Not reported here, the 3-circle policy dummy when introduced as a scale effect has no significant impact either. Hence the increased restrictions on countries from the third circle do not appear to have had a marked impact on migration determinants. Clearly a more meaningful distinction is between immigrants for Northern and Southern countries (columns 1 and 3). Also, there is no fixed effect due to membership in the EU or to sharing a border with Switzerland, even though it also means sharing a language (columns 4 and 5). Nevertheless, there is a fixed effect for countries that combine both characteristics, i.e., border with Switzerland and EU membership (France, Germany and Italy; column 6) possibly because, historically, these countries have been steady sources of migrations to Switzerland. This last specification is thus chosen as the basis for further interpretation.
Northern and Southern migrants show distinctly different responses to migration factors, and it is particularly true for financial incentives. In column 6, relative incomes are not significant in the migration decision by Northern migrants while they have the expected sign and are highly significant for Southern migrants. Since the geographical division is strongly correlated with education levels (and/or FDI movements), the results suggest that skilled immigration from Northern countries occurs independently of income differences. There may be two reasons for this; first, highly educated migrants would not be well represented by average income per capita and, second, when generated by FDI, migrants' decision to move is unlikely to be strongly linked to pure monetary benefits. Northern immigrants are also less sensitive to the presence of a network from their own country (i.e., the elasticity is about half as large as for Southern immigrants). This is consistent with evidence at the regional level presented in OFS (2000) where, the maximum value for the distribution of the concentration indexes across cantons in 1995, is much lower for German, or British migrants (1.79, 2.62) than for Italian, Turkish and Spanish migrants (5.33, 4.49, 3.31) . Again, in case of link with foreign direct investment, the location decision is unlikely to be made by individual migrants.
Finally, the unemployment rate which proxies the quota policy based on labor market needs, has much more impact on immigration from the South than from the North. It is consistent with the fact that Southern immigrants tend to be concentrated in more cyclically sensitive industries and thus, their decision as well as the quota would be strongly affected by the state of the economy. 15 We also tried to estimate an equation for the immigration rate but as it is clear from the results that constraining the source-country effect to unity biases the results.
Next, we attempt to derive some conclusions about incentives by immigrants from Yugoslavia (Table 6 ). The results from the basic specification are reproduced in column 1 and we first test for a possible scale effect of war in the early 1990s. War is a dummy that takes the value 1 starting in mid-1991 with the first bombardment in Croatia and ending in 1995, with the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Column 2 shows there is no significant fixed effect from the war when it is introduced in the basic specification. This is not surprising for at least two reasons. First, income per capita in the region drops sharply and may capture part of the effect.
Second, in the Swiss context, the war is much more likely to have influenced significantly the rate of conversion of seasonal permits and the ensuing family reunions than the number of new permits which is strictly controlled. In fact, both reached their peak in the early 1990s (see Table 3 , column 2) and these series are not included in the dependent variable. So, we can conclude that the labor market could not be used as a channel to get asylum in Switzerland.
The next step is to identify whether migrants from Yugoslavia differ significantly in their decision process to migrate to Switzerland from other source countries' immigrants. In column 3, we exclude the panel of observations representing Yugoslavia from the sample. 16 A comparison of the results with those in Column 1 shows there is no meaningful shift in the estimated parameters. Interestingly, when both Yugoslavia and Turkey are excluded from the sample of Southern countries (column 4), there is a noticeable increase in the push effect of source-country income for the remaining countries, which, incidentally, are all members of the EU. The change however is not statistically significant. 17 Overall the results suggest that migrants from Southern EU countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) and from Southern non-EU countries, including Yugoslavia, respond similarly to financial incentives and other migration drivers in a context of non-discriminatory quotas. Yet, there is a marked difference in the response by Northern (i.e., mostly skilled) and Southern (i.e., mostly unskilled) migrants.
However, these conclusions must be taken with caution as the small time dimension of the panel does not allow for very robust testing of differences in parameters. We now turn to the estimation of the flows for the more recent period, 1995 to 2003.
Preferential treatment for EU immigrants: 1995 to 2003
From 1995 to 2002, immigration from the former Yugoslavia became increasingly restricted and the Republic had split into 5 countries. We use the same specification as for the previous period except for shift dummies representing period-specific events and evaluate again whether in the new policy context incentives differ across source-countries.
For this period, it is not possible to isolate conversions of seasonal permits into longer term permits and they are included in the dependent variable (Lsinfl i,t ). However, observations are still for workers only as family reunions are not included. Therefore, remembering that seasonal permits can be converted to annual permits after a minimum of 4 years and up to 10 years, a dummy is introduced to control for the distinction between countries which historically sent large number of seasonal workers and those who did not (Conversions Seas). Throughout the period workers from EU countries were given priority in hiring and in June 2002 the implementation of the new agreement on free mobility started and a dummy is added to take that policy change into account (EU free mobility). To test for source-country differences in motives to migrate, we follow the same procedure as previously by first estimating the flows from all source countries with and without the distinction between Northern and Southern Europe and, by then, excluding countries that make up the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The results are given in Table 7 with a summary in the lower panel.
First in columns 1 and 2 we test for the robustness of the results to the addition of 4 countries with respect to the previous sample. 18 There is no substantial difference in the results except for Swiss income which becomes weakly significant. So we keep them in the sample and move on to introducing the distinction between Northern and Southern countries (column 3). Similarly to the earlier period, immigrants from Southern European countries are more sensitive to income factors than immigrants from Northern countries (including Canada and the US) and the network effect is stronger even though with a weak significance.
When four countries issued from the former Yugoslavia are eliminated from the sample, 19 there are more noticeable changes than for the earlier period (column 4). For example, in the lower panel, the impact of the Swiss income per capita is almost double implying that migrants from the former Yugoslav region have a lower degree of response to Swiss income. Considering the sample is made of people who have actually migrated, one interpretation is that immigrants from Southern EU countries put more emphasis on the monetary benefits of migration because many non-monetary benefits of daily life in their home country have converged to the Swiss level. Immigrants from the former Yugoslavia may be less sensitive to the pure income aspect given the still otherwise precarious situation in their home country. Non-pecuniary benefits may also include the perspective of permanent residency in Switzerland. Another significant difference is in the network parameter, which is also weaker when the four countries are part of the sample suggesting the existence of a 18 The countries (Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine) were added because the time dimension of the panel is short, they sent a non-negligible number of workers to Switzerland and they are European countries. 19 The four countries are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro. Slovenia is part of Northern countries in our sample as it is part of the group of new EU-members which has more than 50% of immigrants with tertiary education. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 we estimate the inflows for the earlier period (i.e., 1981-1995) including conversions of seasonal permits so that the dependent variable is consistent with the one used for the recent years. As earlier, results hardly change when Yugoslavia is excluded from the sample. Hence, this suggests that the shift in parameters in the recent period is unlikely to result from a different way to measure the dependent variable.
To summarize, a tentative conclusion from the overall results is that workers from the former Yugoslavia respond to migration incentives similarly to their counterparts from other immigrants may put more weight on some unmeasured non-monetary factors than comparable migrants from other countries. In 1995 immigrants from the former Yugoslavia also lost wide access to work permits and under the new policy had to have skills in demand to qualify for permits. Hence, the weakening of the Swiss income effect and of the network effect may also reflect a move toward more skilled migration which, as the results from Northern countries show, does not respond strongly to financial and cultural incentives.
It must be stressed that even though some of these results are shown to be rather robust, caution must apply with their interpretation as the sample, especially for recent years, is rather small, the approach is highly aggregated and unfortunately, there is almost no study on these issues for comparison. Hence, these results need to be compared with others obtained from future studies using different methodologies and particularly microeconomic methodologies.
Pol3c
: dummy equal to 1 from 1990 on for non-EU countries, as the new immigration policy discriminates between EU and non-EU countries for access to work permits.
South
: Sample 1983-1995: dummy equal to 1 for Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) and, EU-candidates and Balkans (Turkey, the former Yugoslavia) whose migrants are in majority unskilled. Sample 1995 Sample -2003 : dummy equal to 1 for Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal) and, EU-candidates and Balkans (Turkey, BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro) whose migrants are in majority unskilled.
UrateCH t-1 : unemployment rate in Switzerland, at the beginning of the period, i.e. end of previous year. ( ILO, 2003) .
War
: dummy variable equal to 1 from June 1991 to end of 1995 and 0 otherwise. It corresponds to the beginning of the Croatia war with the attack on Vukovar and the end of the Bosnia war with the Dayton agreement. 
